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Proving the old spell wrong:  
New African hydrocarbon producers and the ‘resource curse’ 
 
Prof. Dr. Albert Bressand, 92 Avenue de Suffren, 75 015 Paris, France. ab2816@columbia.edu 
Professor of International Strategic Management in Energy, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 




Avoiding the ‘resource curse’ will be key to turning oil and gas discoveries into sustainable 
development for new African producers. The article focuses on international and national policy 
innovations that can cut the economic, institutional and cultural Gordian knot behind the curse. 
‘Oil funds’ have a disappointing record; best practices on why and how to use them are 
ambiguous. By contrast, the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative has triggered learning 
processes of strengthening momentum. Leveraging transparency toward accountability through 
informed national policy debates is now the central policy challenge for new African producers. 
Meanwhile, Corporate Social Responsibility has evolved beyond health and safety to cover a 
firm’s environmental and social impact and can be mobilized in the form of development-
supportive partnerships with investing companies. Much of past policy innovation has been 
defensive in nature, however. The post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals proposed by the 
UN High Level Panel  present governments, companies and stakeholders with a shared positive 
agenda to eradicate poverty and turn natural resources into sustainable development. 
Keywords: Resource curse, economic and institutional channels, Dutch disease, corruption, civil 
wars, conflicts,  Hartwick rule, investors, innovation, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Santiago 
Principles, transparency, Publish What You Pay, EITI, Natural Resources Charter, Equator 
Principles, Corporate Social Responsibility, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), High Level Panel (HLP), Sustainable Development 
Solutions Network (SDSN), UN General Assembly, post-2015, tripartite partnerships. 
 
Introduction and outline  
A ‘resource curse’ has cast an unwelcome shadow on past experiences of large-scale 
hydrocarbon developments in countries lacking a diversified enough economy including a 
majority of the twenty African countries considered as ‘resources-rich’ by the IMF (IMF 2012). 
The discovery of major oil and gas resources in a new group of African countries notably in East 
Africa and the Gulf of Guinea region has the potential to support accelerated development yet an 
essential question is whether the new producers can avoid the curse and, indeed, turn it into the 
blessing it should be. In the words of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan: “Africa is 
standing on the edge of enormous opportunity. Will we invest our natural resource revenue in 
people, generating jobs and opportunities for millions in present and future generations? Or will 
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we squander this opportunity, allowing jobless growth and inequality to take root?” (Africa 
Progress Panel, 2013). 
How being ‘resource rich’ often ends up making countries poorer rather than richer has been 
discussed widely by academics and practitioners in the wake of pioneering work by Sachs, 
Warner, Humphreys, Salai-i-Martin, Subramanian and many other. Yet, from the beginning, and 
even leaving aside Norway, a country in a category of its own, noteworthy exceptions have 
existed—such as Botswana and the United Arab Emirates. A rich experience has accumulated on 
how monetization of natural resource should be managed to ‘do it right’ on the public policy side 
as well as on the corporate side (UNDP, 2011). As we shall see, institutional and strategic 
innovations of the 2000s provide a far more supportive context for policy-makers intent on 
proving the old spell wrong. Corrupt behaviors and institutional shortcomings once seen as an 
inevitable part of the way of doing business are now scrutinized by empowered local 
stakeholders. Tax avoidance and evasion is now high on G8 and G20 meetings’ agendas. Far 
from being confronted with an unavoidable trap, the new producers can make productive use of 
this transformed environment in support of their own innovative approaches to turning energy 
resources into broad-based development.  
As background for its policy-oriented, forward-looking analysis, the article begins with a brief 
survey of existing research on the ‘resource curse’, highlighting its multi-layered nature first in 
terms of the interplay of macroeconomic variables behind the so called ‘Dutch disease’ (section 
1) and continuing with the role of corruption and rent seeking as well as the risk of civil war and 
conflicts (section 2). The first set of policies calling for attention is the creation of ‘stabilization 
funds’, ‘next generation funds’ and other Sovereign Wealth Funds (section 3). While high hopes 
were pinned as such funds as economic buffers against the Dutch disease, as protective tools 
against greed and corruption and as inter-generational transfer tools achievements so far have 
been disappointing, not to say muddied by conflicting objectives and uncertain guiding doctrine. 
By contrast the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) is proving to be game-
changing: its disciplined, well vetted approach to transparency creates higher expectations of 
accountability and innovative processes to pursue such opportunities through multiple layers of 
interactions and partnerships (section 4). Key to the EITI policy and behavioral momentum is the 
nurturing of strong linkages between, on the one hand, the international reporting and 
verification process and, on the other hand, national policies, corporate strategies and pro-active 
participation by local communities and stakeholders. Turning to the essential role of investing 
companies, the article then discusses how company-centric ‘health and safety’ policies have 
evolved into far more comprehensive Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policies (section 5). 
Altogether, new producers can develop their resources in a profoundly transformed policy 
context that can tilt the playing field against forces of corruption and short-sightedness. Yet, 
important as they are, the institutional and policy innovations of the 2000’s remain largely 
defensive in nature, focused on ‘avoiding the resource curse’ and preventing corrupt behaviors. 
The last part of the article highlights therefore how the Millennium Development Goals and their 
post-2015 successors could catalyze a stronger alignment of natural resources development with 
positive goals of poverty elimination and sustainable development. Proposals put forward by the 
26-member High Level Panel (HLP) co-chaired by the Presidents of Indonesia, Sierra Leone and 
the British Prime Minister and by the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) of 
academic institutions provide signposts for a deeper, better prioritized integration of resources 
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exploitation and development policies. New producers need not be passive participants in this 
debate; how responsibly they develop their oil and gas resources and their own diversified 
energy mix will have implications well beyond their borders. 
The article concludes by stressing the critical importance of partnerships in making use of this 
changed policy context and delivering responsible hydrocarbon development. New producers 
may seek inspiration both from the ground-level ‘trilateral partnerships’ with investors and 
communities/stakeholders emphasized in the 2009 UNDP South-South Nairobi conference 
(UNDP, 2011) and from the ‘new global partnership’ called for by the High Level Panel on post-
2015 development goals (UN HLP, 2013).  
     1.  The economic dimension of the resource curse: the ‘Dutch disease’ and its roots 
In the footsteps of seminal work by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (Sachs and Warner, 
1995), and with the example of Nigeria seemingly a dramatic confirmation (Salai-i- Martin and 
Subramanian, 2003; Watts and Kashi, 2008), it has become customary to observe that countries 
that are ‘resource-rich’ tend to be, so to speak, development-poor. Looking back to past decades, 
many authors have contrasted the successful development of countries that were not well 
resources-endowed, such as Singapore and South Korea, with the less impressive results of well 
endowed countries that started from similar levels of development. In Nigeria for instance, 
nearly US$350 billion in oil revenues over the period 1965-2000 and oil revenues per capita 
“increased from US$33 in 1965 to US$325 in 2000, but income per capita has stagnated at 
around US$1100 in PPP terms since its independence in 1960 putting Nigeria among the 15 
poorest countries in the world” (Van der Poel, 2010). In its June 2013 report the Africa Progress 
Panel deplores that “Angola and Equatorial Guinea have some of the largest gaps between 
income and human development as reported in the United Nations Development Programme’s 
Human Development Index (HDI).” Indeed, Angola, Africa’s second-largest exporter of oil, has 
a higher income per capita than Indonesia but its child death rate is comparable with Haiti’s 
(Africa Progress Report 2013). Meanwhile Equatorial Guinea has been the fastest country in the 
world in the recent period (17% p.a.) yet survival of children under the age of 5, a critical 
indicator of overall human development, did not improve. 
By themselves, however, resources are not a good predictor of economic and social development 
(Brunnschweiler, 2008). First, one should distinguish between ‘resource dependency’ and 
‘resource abundance’ (Ding and Field, 2005). In this respect, oil and gas tend to lead to higher 
levels of ‘fiscal dependency’ as higher taxes are more easily levied on producing companies. 
More importantly, as observed by Jean-Philippe Stijns, “what matters is what countries do with 
their natural resources,” and notably the “type of learning process involved in exploiting and 
developing them” (Stijins 2005). The literature on this matter consists of three separate main sub-
sets that overlap, centered respectively on economic performance, institutions and regime 
dynamics and conflict or civil war. Let us discuss first the economic dimension, the one most 
easily amenable to policy intervention. 
From a purely economic perspective, the resource curse manifest itself in the form of a failure to 
develop economic activities other than those centered on the energy and/or natural resources 
sector. The most obvious channel for this crowding out is the exchange rate, giving rise to the 
‘Dutch disease’ whereby an appreciated national currency crowds out domestic manufacturing 
and also makes domestic non-traded goods non competitive. The ensuing de-industrialization or 
failed industrialization (Harding and Venables, 2010) and what Pertusier suggests to call the ‘de-
agriculturization’ of traditional economies  (Pertusier, 2011) can be especially hard on 
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developing countries in an early stage of their development 
Paradoxically, ‘Dutch disease’ effects are fully in line with standard trade-specialization theory, 
reinforcing the use of a country’s comparative advantages in the way Ricardo would have found 
natural. Unfortunately, the comparative advantages in question come with specific 
disadvantages, notably the relatively small number of workers needed in modern oil and gas 
development. Hence the second type of economic channels contributing to the curse, namely 
insufficient linkages between the natural resources sector and the rest of the economy. In a 
dynamic perspective, this leads to insufficient ‘learning by doing’ for the economy at large. 
Turning the resources production and processing sector into a platform from which to launch an 
import-substitution strategy, as attempted under the dependencia theory by countries of the 
Andean Pact (Prebisch 1949), has turned out to be a strategic dead-end. Only a few countries 
have the skills and technology foundations needed to leverage the energy sector into the 
spearhead for a fully fledged industrial and services economy, a difficulty compounded by the 
highly specialized skills and capital equipment now called for in frontier hydrocarbon 
developments such as deep and ultra deep water fields, ‘unconventionals’ and even conventional 
Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR). Incidentally, most developed countries would face a similar 
challenge if they could develop shale gas or tight oil resources: only the U.S. has the capacity to 
deploy thousands of rigs with support from around six hundred thousand specialized industrial 
and services workers (US EIA June 2013). For most developing countries, what tends to happen 
therefore is the development of an ‘off-shore sector’ (figuratively when not literally) with 
precious few linkages to the rest of the economy. Sometimes the domestic sector that does 
develop is not the one the government and investing companies would have encouraged, as is the 
case in Benin where a significant fraction of the population in the border region lives from 
selling gasoline smuggled from Nigeria. Such is the case also in the Niger Delta itself where 
more than one thousand small and primitive illegal refineries (‘cooking spots’) produce gasoline 
from Bony light crude ‘acquired’ in the depth of night through illegal ‘bunkering’ at the cost of 
major leakages (France televisions 2011/2013).  
‘Local content’ policies endeavor to remedy this lack of linkages by imposing the purchase of a 
certain proportion of locally produced goods and services across the energy value chain. 
Significant results have been achieved in countries like Nigeria (Obembe, 2011; Oyejide and 
Adewuyi, 2011). Brazil, a country where the military regime had invested for several decades in 
off-shore technology, has become a leader in deep water drilling and Petrobras, its national 
energy company, is perfectly at ease in the highly competitive US part of the Gulf of Mexico. In 
some cases however, local-content obligations amount to putting the cart before the horse, 
triggering the development of a protected sector in which a few privileged local partners serve as 
gate keepers and rent collectors more than as genuine economic developers and innovators. The 
development of national champions is another avenue but here also results take time. The 
technology race is pretty unforgiving and even seasoned international companies such as ENI 
may see their skills stretched to the limits as could be seen in the early stages of the development 
of the Kashagan field in off-shore Kazakh waters (Bressand, 2009). The world of National Oil 
Companies (NOCs) is a very diverse one and it is no surprise that ENH, the Mozambican NOC, 
is giving itself two to three decades to transform from a state-participation management agency 
into a fully fledged operator (Ocuane, 2013). Natural gas is especially demanding: as stressed by 
Statoil’s Fareed Mohamedi “the development of gas assets, especially in complicated 
environments requires large scale investments, advanced technical expertise, complicated 
pricing and contractual arrangements and marketing prowess […]The impact … on the political 
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economy is more complicated than oil development because it is an ‘economic’ fuel, supporting 
in most cases more productive economic development, and its revenue impact is more gradual 
and also more stable over the long term” The recommended strategy is to use part of the gas 
resources to accelerate the electrification of the country (presently at 15% only in Tanzania) and, 
if possible, liquefy the rest for exports that will generate funding for development by the central 
government (Mohamedi, 2013). 
Altogether, the proper solution to the linkages issue that would seem to be on scale with 
development needs in most of the new producer cases is an indirect one, in which financial 
resources generated by the natural resources sector are used for general economic development 
purposes through investment in human capital, infrastructures and other catalysts of a successful 
integration into the global economy.  
Adopting a financial approach as we recommend brings into light however the third type of 
economic challenge within the resource curse, namely volatility of commodity prices and 
revenues. Not only do commodity prices tend to fluctuate widely—with the recent stable price 
for crude oil an interesting exception--but so does a typical producing country’s tendency to 
consume and import, and so does also the value of the underground collateral on which the 
country can rely when borrowing (Frankel, 2010). As a result, commodity cycles tend to be 
exacerbated by the policies that countries engage into during the commodity cycles. The creation 
of oil funds, as discussed in section 3, is one of the tools available to address this challenge, 
although a very imperfect one. 
     2  Corruption and rent seeking: institutional and political roots of the resource curse 
Altogether, the challenge of building a diversified economy remains a daunting one but none of 
the three economic dimensions we briefly reviewed (i.e. ‘Dutch disease, linkages and volatility) 
is insurmountable. A more comprehensive analysis is in order to capture the unforgiving logic of 
the resource-curse. Two qualitatively different dimensions—the political-institutional one and 
the one related to open conflicts and civil wars—interact with the economic challenges just 
reviewed and may compound them into a curse. Rafael Pertusier, a Petrobras executive with 
strong academic inclinations, can be credited for offering possibly the most enlightening 
synthesis of the literature in the form of a nine-channel framework (which nevertheless leaves 
aside conflict and civil wars) as described in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Channels of Transmission of the Resource Curse. Source: Pertusier, 2011, p. 37. 
4. Rent-Seeking 
5. Human Capital 
6. Social Capital 
7. State Accountability (or Social Contract) 
 
8. Savings (including the Hartwick Rule) 





1. Dutch Disease 





Institutional channels are the ones that loom more prominently in the present debate. It would be 
beyond the scope of this article to analyze in full how capturing state-managed rent may hamper 
development of human capital and of social capital (i.e. a buoyant civic society) in the detailed 
manner Pertusier and other analyze. Let us take corruption as a proxy for, and common root 
behind the four institutional channels in this typology. Corrupt behaviors are pervasive in all 
parts of the world. “Looking at the Corruption Perceptions Index 2012,” observes Transparency 
International in introducing its 2013 report, “it's clear that corruption is a major threat facing 
humanity. […] . While no country has a perfect score, two-thirds of countries score below 50, 
indicating a serious corruption problem”. The development impact of corruption falls most 
heavily on the poorest: “Corruption translates into human suffering, with poor families being 
extorted for bribes to see doctors or to get access to clean drinking water. It leads to failure in 
the delivery of basic services like education or healthcare. It derails the building of essential 
infrastructure, as corrupt leaders skim funds. Corruption amounts to a dirty tax, and the poor 
and most vulnerable are its primary victims” (Transparency International, 2013). Corrupt 
practices contribute to massive losses for developing countries. Using a broader measure of illicit 
capital outflows stemming from crime, corruption, tax evasion, and other illicit activity, and with 
China accounting for almost half of the total, the Global Financial Integrity coalition finds that 
“The developing world lost US$859 billion in illicit outflows in 2010, an increase of 11% over 
2009. From 2001 to 2010, developing countries lost US$5.86 trillion to illicit outflows” (Global 
Financial Integrity, 2012). 
Many reasons account for the dismal performance of extractive industries regarding corruption 
and other un-transparent practices. The large monetary volume associated with a relatively small 
number of transactions makes corruption more tempting. In addition, diverted flows are difficult 
to detect as rent is extracted from concentrated revenue flows resulting from a relatively small 
number of mostly foreign taxpayers (corporations) as opposed to local tax payers. Also energy is 
a highly capital intensive sector, which tends to encourage monopolistic or oligopolistic market 
structures thereby facilitating discretionary control of access. As a result, rent seeking becomes a 
major hindrance to proper development of human capital and of a lively civic society. 
Interestingly, to the economic and institutional/political dimensions of the curse, Pertusier adds 
“depletion channels” by which he refers to “the impossibility of observing optimal depletion 
rules [of a country’s natural resources] if the constraints of the institutional channels and the 
effects of the economic channels are not addressed” (Pertusier, 2011). Ideally, under the 
Hartwick rule, a country with a exhaustible resources should build a stock of capital equivalent 
to the amount of depleted resources so as to prepare themselves for the post-commodity period 
(Hartwick, 1977). Rent seeking and weak institutions tend however to hamper the development 
of the fully competitive financial organizations that would be needed to support such a long term 
financial intermediation. As a result, the pace and manner in which reservoirs are developed 
differs widely from the optimal strategy one can observe for instance in countries such as Saudi 
Arabia where deposits like Ghawar are carefully harnessed with a long term perspective. A well 
known counter example is the opportunistic manner in which some of the Russian reservoirs 
have been exploited after the dismantling of the USSR when property rights were so insecure 
and political discretion so high that accelerated monetization was the strategy of choice 
(Gustafson, 2012).  
 
Last but not least, conflict and civil war are the most extreme forms of the curse. “Secessionist 
rebellions are considerably more likely if the country has valuable resources, with oil being 
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particularly potent” (Collier et al. 2003). How rebel groups may fund themselves through the 
sales of natural resources and whether the latter tend to keep conflicts longer lasting than would 
otherwise be the case is a them abundantly studied (Ross, 2004; Humphrey, 2005). Armed 
conflict can be exacerbated by third-party governments seeking to profit from resource-rich 
neighbors as seems to be happening in Central Africa around the DRC. Conflicts and civil war 
may well extend beyond the borders of the resources-rich state as unaccountable governments 
may use part of the large revenues under their control to illegally supply arms to rebels in 
neighboring countries as was the case when Charles Taylor’s government in Liberia used off-
record revenues from ‘blood diamonds’ to promote rebellion in Sierra Leone.  
More than 1.5 billion people live in fragile and conflict-affected countries. A major step forward 
in development assistance and policies has been a far sharper recognition of the specific 
challenges faced by ‘fragile states’. Nineteen of the fragile and conflict-affected countries came 
together, forming the ‘G7+’ group with a secretariat in Timor Leste to seek progress and 
assistance in common. At the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan, 
South Korea, in December 2011, a New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States was endorsed by 
about forty countries and by major development agencies. The ‘new deal’ sets out five goals: 
legitimate politics, justice, security, economic foundations and revenues and services. Achieving 
the peace-building and state-building objectives supported by the ‘G7+’ group and the New Deal 
agreement is a precondition for sound management of natural resources (a major subject in its 
own right which the present article can only allude to). 
3 Oil funds and ‘next generation funds’: much ado about nothing? 
Setting aside some of the revenues from the sales of natural resources appears to many as an 
essential foundation for responsible management of oil and gas resources and the IMF tends to 
recommend that resource rich countries set up Natural Resource Funds (NRFs or in short oil 
funds) to generate ‘genuine savings’ in line with their long term investment needs1. The high 
hopes once pinned on have proven however more difficult to translate into effective success if 
not part of a much broader tool set (Heuty, 2011).  
A first problem is that “oil funds” are part of a broader group of institutions, the Sovereign 
Wealth Funds (SWFs) responding to heterogeneous objectives through diverse or even 
contradictory avenues. Many SWFs, such as Temasek in Singapore or the three major SWFs set 
up by China, not to mention the one set up by France to protect some key industrial holdings, 
have no relationship with the world of natural resources although they also partake in an effort to 
provide for ‘future generations’. Even pure ‘oil funds’ can be designed with very different 
objectives in mind, ranging from protection from volatility and corruption to development 
funding. Such heterogeneity of both ends and means deprives NRFs of the compelling logic 
associated with EITI and its overarching objective of promoting accountability through 
transparency as we review in the next section. Not surprisingly, a number of countries have 
closed their NRF while others have let it evolve into just another discretionary tool in the hands 
of the well connected. “In Venezuela, Iran and Nigeria,” observes Heuty, “the lack of rules-
based fiscal policy has undermined revenue management and often led to spending that is both 
inefficient and opaque” (Heuty 2011). “The effectiveness of [natural resource] funds in 
                                                          
1
 Genuine saving is the traditional concept of net saving, namely public and private saving minus depreciation of 
public and private investment, plus current spending on education to capture the change in intangible (human) 
wealth minus the value of net depletion of exhaustible natural resources and renewable resources (forests) minus 
damages of stock pollutants of CO2 and particulate matter (van der Poel, 2010). 
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restraining expenditure seems to be limited” observes the IMF in line with its previous finding 
that “saving oil revenues requires making fiscal decisions for which a fund is no substitute” 
(IMF, 2007 and 2001). A fiscal framework based on a long term development strategy and, as 
emphasized by Paul Collier, the creation of a national capacity to invest efficiently (“investing in 
investment”) matter more than the creation of a fund (Heuty, 2011; Collier, 2012). 
SWFs being major investors in developed economies, Western countries grew worried of such 
opaque practices, which led to the creation of an International Working Group on Sovereign 
Wealth Funds with 26 resource-rich and non-commodity exporters as members and with the 
OECD and the World Bank as observers. In 2008 the group approved the Santiago Principles, a 
set of 24 voluntary principles to foster transparency and accountability. These objectives 
however are articulated from the perspective of the developed countries recipient of SWF and 
NRF investment rather than from that of the fund’s home country’s development needs. 
In many cases the reason to create an ‘oil fund’ is to deal with volatility of resources earnings, 
which, as we saw, is only one of the three economic channels behind the resource curse. 
Stabilization efforts were pursued through multi-country mechanisms such as the Stabex and 
Sysmin funds created by the European Union and its African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
partners in the Lome and Yaounde conventions. Few would associate these efforts with 
resounding success. The actual impact of such funds depends on the overall fiscal policy and 
there have been cases, such as Venezuela in 1999-2000, when the stabilization fund ended 
having to borrow at times it was supposed to be lending. Other oil funds endeavor to promote 
inter-generational transfer, which calls for riskier, higher-return investments than the low-risk, 
high-liquidity investment typical of stabilization funds. In fact, the most efficient way to promote 
inter-generational transfer in low-capital stock countries may well be to forego NRF and invest 
instead, upfront, in education and infrastructures (Takizawa et al, 2004; van der Ploeg and 
Venables, 2010). Part of the conflict between the World Bank and Chad over the fund set up to 
save revenues from the Chad-Cameroon pipeline was the Bank’s demand that assets be kept 
offshore, which does protect investment against undue political influence but also guarantees that 
the country’s revenues are not used in support of its own immediate development needs. This led 
Paul Collier and a group of experts at the Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich 
Economies (OxCarre) to launch the Natural Resource Charter, a set of principles on optimal 
resources management that includes a call for stronger public and private domestic investment 
(Precepts 7 and 8) as part of a full value-chain view of resources discovery, exploitation and use. 
Meanwhile the IMF is defending itself against the criticism that it uses the Permanent Income 
Hypothesis (PIH) to advise excessive levels of savings from resources exporters, to the detriment 
of their present development needs and of investment in human capital (IMF, May 2012). 
Altogether, NRFs or ‘oil funds’ appear as means towards heterogeneous policies that raise a 
number of country-specific dilemmas and that requires a broader set of institutions to be 
effective. When such a framework exists—as is the case in Norway from which other countries 
sought inspiration or even managerial help—then the oil fund can be a useful additional policy 
tool. It can even be further leveraged, as Norway has just decided to do, to act as responsible 
investor in the companies in which it invests, closing the loop with the transparency and 
governance agenda. But absent such framework, an oil fund is either an isolated measure putting 




      4  Transparency as the trump card against corruption: the EITI shock wave 
At the beginning of the century, when disillusionment about inequitable or failed development 
reached its apex, transparency emerged as the trump card to foster an across the board re-
alignment of incentives in support of genuine development. Ana Bellver and Daniel Kaufmann 
define transparency as “an increased flow of timely, good quality and reliable economic, social 
and political information, which is accessible to all relevant stakeholders” (Bellver and 
Kaufman, 2005). This however misses that corruption can develop within the investing 
companies and even, in some cases, in civil society if NGOs are created merely to serve as fronts 
for gate-keeping, turning into what is sometimes derided as GRINGOs (Government Run and 
Influenced NGOs). Transparency International, an organization dedicated to combating 
corruption through increased transparency measures, provides a definition that relates more 
straightforwardly to the objective of responsible resources development, namely as: “a principle 
that allows those affected by administrative decisions, business transactions or charitable work 
to know not only the basic facts and figures, but also the mechanisms and processes.” 
(www.transparency.org ). A new culture has developed in which it is no longer taboo to lift the 
veil of opacity that protected what Paul Collier called ‘the plundering of the planet’ (Collier, 
2011). Who could have imagined only one decade ago that a panel of eminent thought leaders 
including a former President of Nigeria would name the president of Angola and his daughter, 
billionaire Isabel dos Santos, among those responsible for preventing Angola’s massive oil and 
gas wealth to benefiting the poor and disenfranchised? Or that the French judiciary could raid 
property belonging to the ruling family of Equatorial Guinea, a country which rose to 45
th
 rank in 
terms of income per capita while moving down 2 slots to rank 136 in terms of Human 
development Index between 2006 and 2011? The genie of transparency is out of the bottle, for 
the better. 
The present momentum to tackle the ‘resource curse’ through greater transparency and 
accountability in the energy and mining industries can be traced back to the creation of the 
Publish What You Pay (PWYP) coalition by London-based NGOs in 2002. The PWYP coalition 
has grown to become a global network comprised of community organizations, international 
NGOs and faith-based groups in more than 70 countries. The rallying cry for the global 
coalition’s campaign was that citizens have the right to see how much their governments receive 
from their natural resources. In addition to the spirit of its campaign, reminiscent of the ‘Let’s 
make poverty history!’ campaign, the PWYP focused on a strategic and yet easily identifiable 
and communicable aspect of the overall institutional aspects of the resource curse. As observed 
by Mabel van Oranje and Henry Parham, “[o]ne of the main factors allowing for the PWYP 
coalition’s expansion is that it has a powerful core objective that has complemented existing 
local priorities of civil society activists promoting good governance and corporate responsibility.  
[…] International NGOs and donor agencies have increasingly mobilised resources to support 
local civil society groups with capacity building and with technical assistance programmes. 
Various information- sharing mechanisms have been used to enable local groups to engage with 
other activists to learn from their experiences and coordinate advocacy efforts” (Van Oranje and 
Parham, 2009). 
The PWYP campaign was instrumental in promoting the creation, also in 2002, of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The objective was to bring governments and investing 
companies together, on a voluntary basis, to set a global standard for transparency in oil, gas and 
mining. By so doing, they would enhance transparency in revenue streams, strengthen 
governance and accountability in resource-rich countries, and significantly improve hydrocarbon 
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management. The EITI works through the publication and the verification of two streams of 
data: all payments investing companies make to governments in connection with extractive 
activities and all government revenues from the same activities. The two sets of data are then 
compared, quite often exposing discrepancies that suggest that some of the revenues were 
appropriated by third parties along the way. A recent example was the finding, made public by 
the Africa Centre for Energy Policy at the August 2013 International Transparency conference in 
Accra, that “Ghana lost a whopping $4.9 billion through illicit financial flows from 1970 to 2008 
in the extractive sector” (Global Financial Integrity Report, 2013). The good news and a 
powerful illustration of how the transparency momentum may lead to actual results, was that, in 
light of such losses, President John Mahama directed the Ministers of Energy and Petroleum and 
Land and Natural Resources, to map out potential areas of resource accumulation and that Ghana 
would adopt a public auction process for licensing concessions which would remove one major 
source of opacity. Similarly, recent EITI audit of Nigeria EITI audits covering the period 2006-
2011 revealed that the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation owed the government around 
USD 8 billion, of which 2billion have already been paid up after Nigerian lawmakers seized on 
the revelations. 
One decade after its creation, EITI has become a central feature of international efforts and of the 
national efforts of forty countries at least to impose higher levels of integrity to relations around 
oil, gas and mining. Almost one billion people in 37 countries now have information about the 
$1 trillion dollars’ worth of revenues that accrue to their countries from extraction of natural 
resources—in practice mining and oil and gas. More than 160 EITI Reports document flows of 
money from natural resources with increasing precision. In Africa, as observed by the IMF, 14 
resource exporters of 20 are currently participating in the EITI of which “all but one has 
completed at least one reconciliation report, and five have been declared fully compliant” (IMF, 
April 2012). In February 2012, Denmark’s DONG became the 63rd oil, gas and mining 
companies to support the EITI on the international level. When presenting this decision to the 
public, Charlotte Strand, Vice President and Head of Finance in DONG E&P, observed that “It is 
part of DONG Energy’s policy to refrain from corruption and other unethical business conduct. 
For the same reason we joined the UN Global Compact’s ten principles covering the areas of 
human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption in 2006. Now as a next natural step 
we also support the EITI”. Tanzania is a member of EITI, one of only 21 countries that the EITI 
Board has declared in full compliance with EITI Standards, meaning that the country has an 
effective process for annual disclosure and reconciliation of all revenues from its extractive 
sector. This allows citizens to see how much their country receives from oil, gas and mining 
companies (TEITI, 2013).  
Beyond the mining sector, the EITI has also convinced over 80 global investment institutions 
that collectively manage over USD 16 trillion (2010 figure) to subscribe to a pledge based on 
EITI principles, the Investors' Statement on Transparency in the Extractives Sector. One 
paragraph of that Pledge is worth quoting as it refers to business risks companies and money 
managers need to bear in mind to protect their long-term ‘license to operate’:  
“We are concerned that extractive companies are particularly exposed to the risks posed by 
operating in these environments. Companies that make legitimate, but undisclosed, payments to 
governments may be accused of contributing to the conditions under which corruption can 
thrive. This is a significant business risk, making companies vulnerable to accusations of 
complicity in corrupt behaviour, impairing their local and global ‘licence to operate’, rendering 
them vulnerable to local conflict and insecurity, and possibly compromising their long-term 
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commercial prospects in these markets” (EITI, 2013). More generally, according to Kolstad and 
Wiig, increased transparency increases the probability of getting caught and […] the likelihood 
that evidence will be properly gathered; makes it easier to induce non-corrupt behavior through 
incentives and to select honest bureaucrats or partners; increases the likelihood of symmetrical 
information which would lead to less rent-seeking behavior, greater accountability, and 
encouragement for the voting public.   
As stressed by the Africa Progress Panel however “The real force for change is the exposure of 
policymakers to the force of public opinion” (Africa Progress Panel, 2013 p.70). The EITI process 
could boil down to a box-ticking, formulistic process telling little about the true state of revenue 
management and use. Clare Short, EITI chair, acknowledges that transparency is only a tool 
toward a broader end in her foreword to the 2013 EITI report “We must not however be under the 
illusion that the EITI can answer all natural resource governance challenges […] We are only at 
the beginning of the journey towards good natural resource management across the world. In 
too many countries, the EITI is not yet generating informed public debate, and the public debate 
is not yet driving the reform that is needed to bring lasting benefits to the people.” Or, in the 
blunter words of Jonas Moberg, head of EITI International Secretariat, “[t]he EITI exists on the 
premise that transparency leads to improved accountability. Well, transparency is starting to 
become a reality. Accountability however will not follow automatically” (EITI, 2013a). 
One limit in the global impact of EITI is that companies and governments adhere to the EITI on 
a voluntary basis only. Even this is changing. In 2007, Nigeria became the first country to make 
participation in EITI compulsory for all oil and gas producing companies. In 2010, the US and 
made it compulsory for US mining and energy companies to join (US, Dodd-Frank Act 2010). 
The EU followed suite with the 2013 Accounting Directive mandating disclosure of payments to 
governments by listed and large non-listed companies with activities in the extractive industry 
and the logging of primary forests (EU 2013).  
Another major debate now raging is about the need to provide a payment by payment picture of 
revenues. Disaggregate payments are known to the auditors compiling national EITI reports but 
the host country is the one deciding whether such information gets published. Currently, there is 
about an even split between both types of reporting being used by EITI countries, with the EITI 
board maintaining a neutral stance on the issue.   
Yet another limitation of the EITI approach concerns its focus on the revenue part of the value 
chain. In Charles McPherson and Stephen MacSearraigh’s words, “The narrow focus on revenue 
transparency ignores phases further up in the value chain such as contract and operations 
monitoring--two stages that are particularly sensitive to nontransparent/corrupt practices, as 
well as operations, distribution of revenues, and expenditures (McPherson and MacSearraigh, 
2007).  Things are moving however, and the contracts themselves are increasingly made public. 
When submitting the Candidature of Senegal to EITI, President Macky Sall said that as part of 
the EITI process, Senegal will publish all mining contracts as well as revenue to be derived from 
these contracts". Candidacy, he stressed, is a key instrument in Senegal’s reform process to 
reduce poverty at a time when prospective oil reserve of roughly 3.5 billion barrels and at least 
13 billion cubic feet of natural gas
 
stand a good chance of being added to gold, iron ore and 
phosphates reserves among the country’s top export earners (EITI, 2013 b). 
A broader criticism although not one quite as daunting is that external prodding is still needed for 
producing countries still need to take transparency and accountability as seriously as their 
development interest commands. This is beginning to change however. While deploring that 
“[f]or too long, African governments have been responding to externally driven transparency 
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agendas. They have been following, not leading”, the Africa Progress Panel also takes note of the 
recent adoption by the African Union of the African Peer Review Mechanism as the main 
framework for monitoring natural resource. Hence their recommendation that African 
governments should build on the Africa Mining Vision and “institute transparent systems of 
auctions and competitive bidding for concessions and licences, as well as tax regimes that reflect 
both the real value of their countries’ natural resource assets and the need to attract high quality 
investment”. They urge them also to “adopt legislation that requires companies bidding for 
concessions and licences to fully disclose their beneficial ownership” (Africa Progress Report 
2013).  
 
5 Corporate Social Responsibility: how investors can pro-actively contribute 
The role of the investing companies is essential in achieving responsible development of 
hydrocarbons. Publication of payments to government is only one aspect of a broader agenda 
that includes ‘don’t do’ as well as ‘do’ prescriptions. On the ‘don’t’ side, the Africa Progress 
Panel stressed in its 2013 report that “When foreign investors make extensive use of offshore 
companies, shell companies and tax havens, they weaken disclosure standards and undermine 
the efforts of reformers in Africa to promote transparency. Such practices also facilitate tax 
evasion and, in some countries, corruption, draining Africa of revenues that should be deployed 
against poverty and vulnerability.” But the Panel is not alone in taking a closer look at tax 
optimization and tax avoidance behaviors, now a regular item of international summits. They can 
therefore “call on the G8 and the G20 to step up to the mark, to show leadership in the 
development of a credible and effective multilateral response to tax evasion and avoidance” 
(Africa Progress Report 2013). But the ‘do’ side is just as important since investors are needed as 
active partners together with local communities and stakeholders. What companies do beyond 
their legal obligations in support of causes that are not strictly limited to profit maximization is 
referred to as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Companies also see a benefit in creating 
‘social capital’ that will facilitate on-the-ground operations through easier grievance resolution, 
more transparent distribution of project tax and royalty, and community empowerment. 
In many large and not so large companies, the former approach based on strict legal compliance 
is complemented with a pro-active affirmation of a given company’s values. In 1997 Shell 
adopted its Statement of General Business Principles and one year later BP followed with its 
“We stand for” statement. Then companies began working in closer and closer relationship with 
stakeholders. Shell for instance went from the “community assistance” of the early 1990s, akin to 
charity work, to “community development” (1997) and from there to “sustainable community 
development programs” (2004).  Previous practices akin to a charity approach, such as cash 
payments to communities, are giving way to work with NGOs and development agencies.  
In addition to affirming their values in their own mission statements, companies are also coming 
together to identify and affirm common principles of integrity, as is the case in the framework of 
the World Business Council for Sustainable development (WBCSD). Most strikingly, a group of 
financial institutions active in project finance came together to create the Equator Principles in 
2003 and to revise them in 2006. They constitute a common baseline and framework the 
implementation of each institution’s internal social and environmental policies, procedures and 
standards related to its project financing activities. This common framework encourages 
information sharing and the identification of best practices. Currently, 78 financial institutions 
apply the Equator Principles to projects of US$10 million or more across all industry sectors. 
Altogether, the culture change that we detected in producer countries in the wake of the EITI 
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endeavor has some equivalent—even if less than an overwhelming one—in the world of 
investors. Making the two cultural changes cross-fertilize will call for partnerships in which 
objectives are not merely those captured in project balance sheets but pertain to the development 
process broadly defined. Hence the importance of changes at work regarding how the 
international community approaches universal development objectives. 
Embracing development objectives is an open-ended undertaking however, and companies are 
better at accomplishing relatively well identified tasks. “While the management of environmental 
issues is well understood by the oil, gas and mining industries,” observe Warner and Sullivan, 
“social issues are a relatively new area of management focus.” Progress on the CSR front 
notwithstanding, there are limits to what companies can contribute; they should focus on 
contributions in line with their core competencies (Bressand, 2011). But the move from being 
mere ‘environment takers’ to acting as ‘environment shapers’ in partnership with other is 
underway and can be mobilized. “Today, the demand from many quarters is for companies to be 
part of a ‘smarter’ type of social investment, one that reflects the complex relationship between 
mitigating negative social impact and promoting community development”. The reward for 
companies in accepting this more complex set of objectives is that its ‘social license to operate’ 
can only be strengthened if “affected communities and households feel that the company is 
responsive to their concerns” (Warner & Sullivan, 2004). 
     6  Hydrocarbons, poverty alleviation and the coming Sustainable Development Goals 
The 21st century opened indeed on a new wave of reasoned optimism regarding the fate of the 
poorest countries. By adopting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and by focusing on 
eight compelling targets to be reached by 2015, the Millennium Summit of heads of States in the 
year 2000 unleashed a dynamics that has proven more impressive and more resilient than most 
imagined. True, this happened after the embrace of free market policies in China, from 1979 
onward, and then in India in 1989, had removed major self-inflicted obstacles to development 
leading to fairly dramatic economic growth well above the infamous ‘Hindu growth rate’ and its 
Maoist equivalent. In the view of Jagdish Bhagwati, such acceleration of economic growth 
achieved far more in poverty alleviation than programs and policies focused on helping the poor 
had in previous decades (Bhagwati 2010). Nevertheless, it did matter that the international 
community placed performance in meeting basic human needs above increasingly sterile 
disputes over the ‘Washington consensus’ or the New International Economic Order (NIEO). 
International and national institutions could now be held accountable for progress in ways the 
man and woman in the street could understand. Donor-recipient relations have also changed 
significantly. Aid is a less prominent part of development financing thanks to globalization, to 
expanding trade and to favorable changes in terms of trade and/or in market shares for resources-
rich and emerging economies. In addition, the debate on aid effectiveness (Paris agreement, 2005 
and Accra convention 2008) has led to a more balanced relationship in which finger pointing—
by donors to recipients and by the latter to conditionality or to capitalism—has given way to 
what begins to look like mutual accountability and shared responsibility. Aid is neither 
indispensible nor a god-given right, it can now be discussed, even if old rhetorical habits die 
hard, as part of a broader process of development funding in which developing countries—
notably resource-rich countries—have greater means for self-reliance—this at a time when 
South-South trade has taken off and calls for ‘collective self-reliance’ lose much of their 
ideological tones in a faster moving, more pragmatic, pluri-centric world. 
 
Results in pursuit of the MDGs have been encouraging even if fragile countries and countries in 
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conflict have largely stayed aside. As summarized by the High Level Panel (HLP) set up by the 
UN Secretary General to advise on post-2015 development strategy, the number of people living 
with less than $1.25 per day is on its way to falling below 15% of developing countries’ 
population in 2015 against 46% in 1990. Enrolment in primary education has increased by 18 
points in sub-Saharan Africa to 76% and by 12 points to 91% in South Asia. The mortality rate 
for children under five has declined by a third. True, other goals have proven more difficult to 
achieve. The proportion of people exposed to hunger has leveled out at 16% in developing 
countries. The number of workers in informal ‘vulnerable jobs’ stopped decreasing in 2008. One 
in eight children in sub-Saharan Africa still dies before the age of five, twice the developing 
countries’ average and 18 times the developed regions’ average (UN HLP, 2013). Yet, by and 
large, unlike the situation that faced Nigeria and Angola in previous decades, the new producers 
will be developing their hydrocarbon resources at a time when their own progress towards the 
MDGs are, or can become very significant. As highlighted by the Africa Progress Panel, 
Tanzania already reduced extreme poverty from 84% to 67 % between 2000 and 2007. 
Mozambique also recorded a major advance: poverty fell from 74 % in 2002 to 59 % in 2007. 
Ghana reduced extreme poverty by one-third between the end of the 1990s and 2005. In 
Cameroon and Mali, however, increased growth had no discernible effect on poverty – and 
Nigeria and Zambia registered small increases in poverty despite increased growth (Africa 
Progress Panel, 2013).  
Major resources are going to be available in countries fully engaged in the global war against 
extreme poverty and already familiar with the imperatives of transparency, accountability and 
broad-based democratic debate on the use of natural resources fostered by the EITI which we 
have described above. To quote from the Africa Progress Panel again “In many resource-rich 
countries anticipated revenue flows are very large in relation to the estimated costs of closing 
the national poverty gap, as indicated by the financing requirements for bringing each poor 
person up to a poverty line income. In Guinea, Liberia and Mozambique, the average annual 
revenues projected by the IMF from current natural resource projects could eradicate extreme 
poverty” (Africa Progress Panel, 2013).  
 
Conclusion: the responsible resources development agenda 
Many of the mechanisms behind the ‘resource curse’ are embedded in challenging relationships 
between macroeconomic variables (growth, savings, resources exhaustion…) and complex 
learning processes of an economic, social and strategic nature—not forgetting the needed 
‘investment in investing’ to master efficient deployment of resources over time (Collier, 2012). 
These challenges will not disappear yet the progress we have reviewed on several key fronts 
mean that they can be addressed in a much more supportive context. After all, the survey of the 
resource curse literature brings to light that, in the end, so many factors come into play, from 
resource endowment to types of political regime and leadership style (van de Ploeg, 2011), that 
curse or blessing must be considered a wide open outcome in a given country. The 
transformation in the international and African policy context we have described can therefore 
make a very significant difference if it becomes embedded in a culture of accountability—the 
same culture that the Paris, Accra and Busan conventions of 2005, 2008 and 2011 have promoted 
within the global development community.  
A powerful combination could take shape whereby the progress towards transparency and 
accountability of the previous decade provides a high quality policy context in which to mobilize 
resources in support of the MDGs and their successor goals. Much of the discussion in the past 
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has been about developing countries investing to develop capital and labor skills commensurate 
with what can take them along the path of development as captured in standard economic models 
that devoted limited attention to the poverty trap and to what the MDG agenda has revealed. 
Inefficient use of resources, outside of rent capture, was attributed by many to ‘white elephants’ 
projects and other efforts by politicians in resource-rich countries to stay in power van der 
Ploeg). In a more transparent policy environment, success in the fight against extreme poverty 
and some of the compelling SDGs presently being articulated could replace ‘white elephants’ as 
a more productive transmission belt between policy discretion regarding use of economic 
resources and political gains.  
An interesting paradox for the new energy producers will be that part of the SDGs will tend to be 
predicated on negative views of the role of hydrocarbons in connection with detrimental climate 
change. Attracted to the purest approaches rather than to the most effective ones, the activist 
community tends to over-emphasize alternative energy sources when all quantitative modeling 
points to a persistent role for hydrocarbons and therefore to the need for responsible hydrocarbon 
development including through carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) in conjunction with, 
rather than as alternative, to the exuberantly pursued ‘transition’. This however will only make 
the international debate more stimulating and interesting to follow. The opportunity for new 
producers to lead will rise in consequence: a common culture is one to which all contribute and 
in which all learn for each other experiences. Progress on the several fronts we have reviewed 
mean that, more than ever, the resource curse will not predicated from backward-looking 
econometric regressions but from forward looking policy and corporate strategic decisions. 
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